An Enhanced Communication Protocol for Location Privacy in WSN by Abuzneid, Abdelshakour A. et al.
Research Article
An Enhanced Communication Protocol for
Location Privacy in WSN
Abdel-Shakour Abuzneid, Tarek Sobh, and Miad Faezipour
University of Bridgeport, Bridgeport, CT, USA
Correspondence should be addressed to Abdel-Shakour Abuzneid; abuzneid@bridgeport.edu
Received 28 November 2014; Revised 27 February 2015; Accepted 8 March 2015
Academic Editor: Xinyi Huang
Copyright © 2015 Abdel-Shakour Abuzneid et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
Wireless sensor network (WSN) is built of many sensor nodes.The sensors can sense a phenomenon, which will be represented in a
formof data and sent to an aggregator for further processing.WSN is used inmany applications, such as object tracking and security
monitoring. The objects in many situations need physical and location protection. In addition to the source location privacy, sink
location privacy should be provided. Providing an efficient location privacy solution would be challenging due to the open nature of
the WSN. Anonymity is a key solution for location privacy. We present a network model that is protected against local, multilocal,
and global adversaries that can launch sophisticated passive and active attacks against the WSN.
1. Introduction
A wireless sensor node (SN) is a simple autonomous host
device. It can sense a phenomenon, convert the sensed infor-
mation into data, process the data, and then transmit the data
to a base station (BS) for further analysis. The SN host is
very limited in terms of storage space, memory, processing
power, communication bandwidth, and battery energy [1].
This work focuses on monitoring and tracking applications,
such as tracking animal in the wildlife or a fellow soldier
in the battlefield. When the SN senses an object, it reports
data by sending it hop-by-hop to the BS. One of the most
common applications discussed in the literature is the panda
monitoring game [1]. When a sensor node detects a Panda
in a certain area, it should report the data via a message
to the BS. The fact that the data is sent out of the SN
in open environment will be a reason for the adversary
(ADV) to know the location of the SN and consequently the
location of the object. In order to protect the Panda from
the ADV, we need to implement in place an efficient source
location privacy scheme (SLP). SLP is even more important
in military, homeland security, and law enforcement, in
addition to many civilian applications [2]. We need, as well,
to provide location privacy for the BS (BSLP), which is the
data aggregator and the controller of the WSN. The solution
needs to provide anonymity where the ADV cannot know the
identity of the SNs. We have to reduce the capture likelihood
and increase safety period. Safety period is the time before the
first SN is captured. All transmissions in the WSN happen in
the open air where the SNs are unattended. One of the most
important issues that any solution needs to account for is the
energy conservation to maintain a longer life for the WSN.
Thus, applying regular privacy and security algorithmsmight
not be suitable for such networks.
2. Problem Statement
Privacy in WSN is typically categorized into two categories:
data privacy and context privacy [3]. Data privacy focuses on
data aggregation and data query. Contextual privacy involves
location privacy, identity privacy, routing privacy, and tempo-
ral privacy. Providing SLP and BSLP could be achieved using
many schemes such as randomwalk, geographic routing, delay,
dummy data sources, cyclic entrapment, anonymization, cross-
layer routing, separate path routing, network coding, and other
schemes [1, 4].
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In this work, we will use anonymization to provide SLP
and BSLP. One of the first works to classify context privacy
was done by Kamat et al. [5, 6], where they addressed the
Panda hunter game. They claim that the routing scheme is
responsible for hiding source location of an object.They have
used two metrics to measure SLP: first, the safety period,
which is the number of messages a source sends before it
is captured, and second, the capture likelihood, which is the
probability that an adversary can capture the source within
a certain period. There are generally two ways to locate
a source using passive attacks: traffic analysis [3, 7] and
packet tracing [3, 8, 9]. We provide a framework that can
be tested against other solutions using five metrics: security:
the probability that the adversary successfully identifies the
source, the intermediary SNs, or the BS; energy cost, where
the solution will provide privacy with reasonable energy
conservation; storage memory cost and delivery time, where
the solution should consume a reasonable storage space
and provide reasonable delays; safety period, where the
solution will guarantee transmission of reasonable amount
of messages before the first SN is captured. The rest of
this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we give
some background and literature survey. In Section 4, we will
explain the suggested system model, network model, threat
model, and the traffic model. In Section 5, we will introduce
our anonymity protocol. In Section 6, wewill have a thorough
security analysis. In Section 7, we will have performance
analysis and evaluation. In Section 8, we will summarize our
work and suggest some additional models to the framework
in the future work.
3. Background and Literature Survey
There aremany solutions, which have been presented to solve
the problems of SLP and BSLP. Conti et al. [1] categorized the
solutions into groups. They have discussed many solutions
and compared them in terms of the threat model, view of the
network, power consumption, exposed information, and effi-
ciency in providing “location privacy.” Recently, anonymity
has become a concern for WSNs. We have identified impor-
tant literature discussing solutions for anonymity in WSN,
such as HIR: Hashing-Based ID Randomization [10]; RHIR:
Reverse HIR [10]; SAS: Simple Anonymity Scheme [11];
CAS: Cryptographic Anonymity Scheme [11]; MAQ: Max
QueryAggregation [12]; APR:Anonymous PathRouting [13];
ACS: Anonymous Communications Scheme [14]; DCARPS:
Destination Controlled Anonymous Routing Protocol for
Sensor Nets [2]; PhID: Phantom ID [15]. None of these
solutions provides location privacy against global ADVs and
active attacks. A reasonable solution against global adversary
introduced by Chen et al. [16] called efficient anonymous
communication (EAC), which provides sender, link, and sink
anonymity. The solution consists of three phases. Every SN
creates multiple pseudonym IDs, which are global anony-
mous identity, anonymous broadcast identity, and anony-
mous one-hop identity, and anonymous acknowledgement
identity. Each transmission should have a new anonymous
pseudonym. The solution is relatively light; however, it easily
breaks pseudonym synchronization. In addition, it fails to
provide BSLP and it is not secure against traffic rate analysis
attacks. We know that anonymization is not enough to
achieve end-to-end privacy. There are some solutions based
on dummy data sources where SNs send out fake packets
to other nodes within the network. A fake packet does not
contain any information about any real event but it helps
to obfuscate the real traffic and to divert the adversary. The
literature shows reasonable solutions using dummy sources.
Some of them are designed to handle local ADV. However,
few are suitable for global ADV. Some of the literatures
presume a certain routing scheme, topology, network, and
threat models. Ouyang et al. [17] introduced three different
solutions to handle the global ADVs. In this work, we
will enhance EAC, the efficient anonymous communicating
protocol [16, 18]. EAC does not handle the pseudonyms
synchronization very well. There are many situations where
the system will get unsynchronized. It also could not handle
multi-colluding adversaries and lacks a mechanism for time
correlation attack. There is an extension for EAC presented
in [4] which has reasonably addressed some of the issues of
EAC. Most of the other solutions do not handle global or
multi-colluding adversaries. Each solution focuses on certain
scenarios of attacks. Our work is aimed to be comprehensive.
4. Preliminaries
Our contribution in this work provides sender anonymity,
receiver anonymity, link anonymity, SLP, BSLP, and data
privacy. The system is fed with inputs, such as the nature
of the ADVs in the network and the residual energy in the
SNs. We assume bidirectional links where two nodes are
considered neighbors if they can hear each other [2]. The
network considers one BS which aggregates sensed data from
all the SNs.The BS works as an interface to the wired network
[11]. Data packets generated by SNs are addressed to the BS;
however, they go through multihop paths. Control packets
are sent from the BS to the SNs by unicast or broadcast
messages. To enhance BSLP, the BS acts like a normal SN
in the network when it communicates with other SNs, to
make it indistinguishable. The WSN runs in two phases:
startup phase and communication phase. We assume that
the SNs have the ability to obfuscate the addresses at the
MAC level header [11]. All sensors are time synchronized
[11].There are many algorithms for SNs time synchronization,
which is out of the scope of this work. The WSN will need
a protocol for network topology discovery that allows the BS
to view the global topology of the network without revealing
the BS location [2]. The adversary nodes have very strong
capabilities compared to the SNs. They are resource-rich;
they have sufficient energy supply, computation capabilities,
and unlimited storage memory. An adversary could run
both passive and active attacks. We presume that only few
compromised nodes could exist at one time due to the imple-
mentation of intrusion detection system (IDS) which is able
to detect compromised SNs. We assume a global adversary,
which can monitor the traffic of the entire network and can
determine the node responsible for the initial transmission.
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Assuming a global adversary means the following: (a) the
worst-case scenario for area coveragewhere colluding sensors
can cooperate to cover the whole network area [21]; (b) the
worst-case scenario for timing where the coverage area of
the adversary is not known at any time [21]. We also assume
that the adversary is capable of observing SNs transmissions
over extended periods. It is, however, not able to break
the encryption algorithms or the hash functions used for
securing data during transmission. We presume abundant
traffic where sensors detect and transmit many packets, such
as in the applications of environment monitoring.
5. Proposed Anonymous Model
The communication process is divided into two phases, nam-
ely: startup phase and communication phase.
5.1. Startup Phase. Prior to actual distribution of the sensors
in the field of application, the SNs need to be tested,
fully charged, and preloaded with some parameters which
are needed during the startup phase and then during the
communication phase. All parameters and terms used for the
proposed solution are mentioned in Notations [4, 16, 19].
It is typical to presume that theWSN is considered secure
for some short period after SNs’ deployment in the field
and before the steady communication phase. Zhu et al. [22]
presented that WSN has a lower bound on the time interval
that the adversary needs to be able to compromise a SN.
During this time, the SNs can communicate and exchange all
preloaded and calculated parameters safely. The SNs need to
know their relative locations to the BS and to the neighboring
SNs. Likewise, the BS needs to know the location of all the
SNs participating in theWSN.There areNemours localization
schemes which are proposed in the literature [11, 16, 23, 24].
After the localization process is completed, each SNwill know
its smallest hop-count to the BS (hc
𝑖↔bs).
5.1.1. Issuing the Pseudonyms. A SN uses any issued pseu-
donymonly once.Thatmeanswe need to use a one disposable
pseudonym per a transmission. There are five kinds of trans-
missions that could happen in the WSN [4, 16]: (i) multihop
transmission between a SN and BS, (ii) transmission between
two neighbor SNs, (iii) broadcast sent by a SN or the BS, (iv)
acknowledgement, and (v) fake broadcast. The process starts
by creating a pseudonym ID for each SN
𝑖
, and we call it for
short (PID
𝑖
) which is issued using the following expression:
PID
𝑖
= 𝐻 (ID
𝑖
⊕ 𝑎
𝑖
) . (1)
The SN
𝑖
can calculate the broadcast pseudonym ID (BPID
𝑖
)
according to the following expression:
BPID
𝑖
= 𝐻 (ID
𝑖
⊕ 𝑏
𝑖
) . (2)
The SN
𝑖
can calculate the fake broadcast pseudonym ID
(FBPID
𝑖
) according to the following expression:
FBPID
𝑖
= 𝐻 (ID
𝑖
⊕ 𝑐
𝑖
) . (3)
SN
𝑖
should know its entire neighbor set𝑁
𝑖
. A neighbor SN
𝑗
is
a sensor that could receive signal from the SN
𝑖
and vice versa
through one-hop transmission. SN
𝑖
will send 𝑀discovery, a
broadcast discoverymessage, to exchange parameters with all
one-hop neighbors. The format of the message is as follows:
𝑀discovery
= 𝑘dis
⋅ (TTL ‖ ID
𝑖
‖ 𝑘
𝑖↔bs ‖ kb𝑖 ‖ fkb𝑖 ‖ 𝑎𝑖 ‖ 𝑏𝑖 ‖ 𝑐𝑖 ‖ HC𝑖↔bs) .
(4)
The value of TTL should be one for this transmission. SN
𝑖
will
receive also a similar broadcast message from SN
𝑗
and from
all other neighbors. Both SN
𝑖
and SN
𝑗
will calculate a new
random value (𝑎
𝑖↔𝑗
) according to the following expression:
𝑎
𝑖↔𝑗
= 𝐻(ID
𝑖
⊕ ID
𝑗
) . (5)
Both SN
𝑖
and SN
𝑗
will calculate also a new pairwise key 𝑘
𝑖↔𝑗
according to the following expression:
𝑘
𝑖↔𝑗
= 𝐻(𝑘
𝑖↔bs ⊕ 𝑘𝑗↔bs) . (6)
SN
𝑖
also calculates broadcast pseudonym ID for SN
𝑗
(BPID
𝑗
)
according to expression (2). SN
𝑖
has already received the
values of ID
𝑗
and 𝑏
𝑗
through𝑀discovery. It also calculates the
one-hop pseudonym ID (OHPID
𝑖↔𝑗
) shared between SN
𝑖
and SN
𝑗
as expressed in the following expression:
OHPID
𝑖↔𝑗
= 𝐻(𝑎
𝑖
⊕ 𝑎
𝑗
) . (7)
Finally, acknowledgement pseudonym ID for SN
𝑖
(APID
𝑖
)
will be calculated according to the expression below:
APID
𝑖
= 𝐻 (ID
𝑖
) . (8)
SN
𝑖
will have a table TBL
𝑖
which contains the shared values
with the neighbors as listed in Table 1.Thus, we have replaced
the ID with quintuple pseudonyms [4] to reference the SN
during the communication. Figure 1 shows two sensors after
they have exchanged the required pseudonyms.
5.1.2. Deleting Security Information. After storing all required
pseudonyms, parameters, and keys in TBL
𝑖
for SN
𝑖
, it would
be the time to delete all unnecessary information for the
purpose of security [4, 16, 25]. In addition, it will release some
memory storage space [16, 18]. Most importantly, SN
𝑖
will
delete ID
𝑖
and HC
𝑖↔bs, which could be critical information
for the adversary. In addition, SN
𝑖
will delete discovery
messages received earlier from the neighbors.
5.2. Communication Phase. During the steady communica-
tion phase, when sensing and sending data by nodes to the
BS takes place, seven operations continue until the network
lifetime ends.These operations are [4] (i) sensing and sending
a message to a neighbor, (ii) forwarding a message to a
neighbor, (iii) broadcasting a message, (iv) acknowledge-
ment, (v) sending a fake message, (vi) SN addition, and (vii)
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Mdiscovery = kdis(TTL || ||IDi ki↔bs || kbi || fkbi || || || ||ai bi ci HC i↔bs)
ai↔j = H(IDi ⊕ IDj)
OHPIDi↔j = H(ai ⊕ aj)
ki↔j = H(ki↔bs ⊕ kj↔bs)
BPIDj = H(IDj ⊕ bj)
FBPIDj = H( ⊕ cj)IDj
ai↔j = H(IDi ⊕ IDj)
OHPIDi↔j = H(ai ⊕ aj)
ki↔j = H(ki↔bs ⊕ kj↔bs)
BPIDi = H(IDi ⊕ bi)
FBPIDi = H(IDi ⊕ ci)
SNi SNj
Figure 1: Two SN neighbors share the required pseudonyms.
Table 1: Shared values among sensor neighbors. If SN
𝑖
has 𝑁
𝑖
neighbors, then TBL
𝑖
will have 𝑁 tuples, one tuple per a neighbor
[4, 16].
Information in 𝑇
𝑖
per each neighbor Tuple for SN
𝑗
Shared random number 𝑎
𝑖↔𝑗
Shared broadcast random number 𝑏
𝑗
Shared fake broadcast random number 𝑐
𝑗
Shared broadcast key BPID
𝑗
Shared fake broadcast key FPID
𝑗
Shared one-hop key 𝑘
𝑖↔𝑗
Current one-hop pseudonym ID OHPID
𝑖↔𝑗
Link direction link
𝑖→ 𝑗
Residual energy level Δ
𝑗
SN removal. A SN will have three roles, in terms of data
transmission, during the communication phase [4, 16, 25]: (i)
role as a sensor, (ii) as a forwarder or intermediary node, and
(iii) as a broadcaster. In the following sections, wewill use SN
𝑖
as a source node and SN
𝑗
as a neighbor to the source.
5.2.1. Transmission as a Sensor. When SN
𝑖
senses data, it
needs to send a message hop-by-hop to the BS. The SN
𝑖
only
recognizes itself by its newly calculated pseudonym (PID
𝑖
),
and the BS will recognize source of themessage through PID
𝑖
identity as well. Thus, the PID
𝑖
of the source needs to be
included in themessage until it reaches the BS. Consequently,
the PID of a sensor will be updated after every transmission.
When data is sensed and ready to be sent out, the SN
𝑖
needs to
select one neighbor from𝑁
𝑖
to forward the message to it.The
selection process goes through a probabilistic protocol which
guarantees that SN
𝑖
does not depend all the time on one
neighbor when forwarding its data; first, for routing privacy
and second for increasing the lifetime of the WSN. SN
𝑖
will
form the message in the following format:
𝑀
𝑖→ 𝑗
= OHPID
𝑖↔𝑗
‖ 𝐸
𝑘𝑖→ 𝑗
⋅ (PID
𝑖
‖ 𝐸
𝑘𝑖↔bs
(𝐷
𝑖
)) ‖ HMAC
𝑘𝑖↔bs
⋅ (PID
𝑖
‖ 𝐷
𝑖
) .
(9)
Once SN
𝑖
knows that the message (𝑀
𝑖→ 𝑗
) is delivered to the
BS, it needs to dispose of the current pseudonym PID
𝑖
and
issue a new one for the next transmission as indicated in the
following expression:
PID
𝑖
= 𝐻 (PID
𝑖
⊕ 𝑎
𝑖
) . (10)
In addition, both SN
𝑖
and SN
𝑗
will dispose of the current
OHPID
𝑖→ 𝑗
and issue a new one for the next communication
between the two sensors according to following expression:
OHPID
𝑖→ 𝑗
= 𝐻(OHPID
𝑖→ 𝑗
⊕ 𝑎
𝑖→ 𝑗
) . (11)
Themessage𝑀will then be reformatted by the recipient SN
𝑗
.
Then, it will be forwarded to the next node, in the path, SN
𝑟
,
and so on, until it gets to the BS. If SN
𝑗
was the BS, then the
BS uses the shared one-hop key between the sensor and the
BS to decrypt the encrypted data and gets the PID
𝑖
, which the
BS can use to recognize the SN
𝑖
. Thus, the BS will be able to
recognize the originator of this message. Only at this point
of time, BS can update the value of PID
𝑖
of SN
𝑖
. It also gets
the data (𝐷
𝑖
) which BS can read after decrypting the data by
𝑘
𝑖↔bs.
5.2.2. Transmission as a Forwarder. When SN
𝑖
sends the
message one-hop uplink to the neighbor SN
𝑗
, SN
𝑗
needs to
forward the message to another intermediary node or in the
best case to the BS if SN
𝑗
is a neighbor of the BS. Upon
receiving 𝑀
𝑖→ 𝑗
, SN
𝑗
will match OHPID
𝑖→ 𝑗
in its table, 𝑇
𝑗
,
under the column related to SN
𝑖
. If there is no match, then
the message definitely is not addressed for SN
𝑗
and it will
be dropped immediately. If it matches, then the message is
addressed to SN
𝑗
and it will be decrypt using 𝑘
𝑖→ 𝑗
. The
message will be forwarded to SN
𝑟
after𝑀 is reformatted as
in
𝑀
𝑗→𝑟
= OHPID
𝑗↔𝑟
‖ 𝐸
𝑘𝑗→𝑟
⋅ (PID
𝑖
‖ 𝐸
𝑘𝑖↔bs
(𝐷
𝑖
)) ‖ HMAC
𝑘𝑖↔bs
(PID
𝑖
‖ 𝐷
𝑖
) .
(12)
Right after the data is received by SN
𝑗
and forwarded to
the next one-hop SN
𝑟
, the SN
𝑗
updates both pseudonyms,
OHPID
𝑖↔𝑗
and OHPID
𝑗↔𝑟
. SN
𝑗
now is ready to exchange
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another message with SN
𝑖
using the new pseudonym
OHPID
𝑖↔𝑗
. However, SN
𝑗
is not yet ready to send data to
SN
𝑟
since SN
𝑟
does not update the OHPID
𝑗↔𝑟
until 𝐷
𝑖
is
forwarded to the next hop, say NSV. What would happen if
SN
𝑗
senses new data while it is busy forwarding a previous
message? It has to wait until OHPID
𝑗↔𝑟
is updated or it can
use a different neighbor to forward the new message.
5.2.3. Acknowledgment. As expected in data networks, mes-
sage could be lost or become corrupted. In either case,
retransmission is required. Because SNs change PIDs after
each transmission, synchronizing PIDs is crucial. Updating
the pseudonyms depends on successfulmessage transmission
and reception. Technically, a sender and a receiver should
alter the pseudonym value only after making sure that the
data are sent correctly and received perfectly by the BS. The
lack of direct connection between the sender and the receiver
makes it a complicated process. The BS cannot send direct
acknowledgement to the source if it ismultiple hops away.We
have to dependonmultiple acknowledgements along the path
between the source and the destination. Transmitting data
through a route of 𝑦 hops needs 𝑦 acknowledgements. SN
𝑖
needs to calculate acknowledgement pseudonym ID (APID
𝑖
)
according to the following expression:
APID
𝑖
= 𝐻 (APID
𝑖
⊕ 𝑏
𝑖
) . (13)
The message will be sent out now with the current value for
APID
𝑖
. Thus, we will rewrite𝑀
𝑖→ 𝑗
as it appears in
𝑀
𝑖→ 𝑗
= Padding ‖ OHPID
𝑖↔𝑗
‖ 𝐸
𝑘𝑖→ 𝑗
⋅ (APID
𝑖
‖ PID
𝑖
‖ 𝐸
𝑘𝑖↔bs
(𝐷
𝑖
)) ‖ HMAC
𝑘𝑖↔bs
⋅ (PID
𝑖
‖ 𝐷
𝑖
) .
(14)
Padding is added to make sure all the one-hop packets have
the same size to prevent ADV from identifying the source by
traffic analysis and size correlation attacks.When SN
𝑗
receives
the packet, it will reformat the packet as in expression (15) and
then will send it to SN
𝑟
:
𝑀
𝑗→𝑟
= APID
𝑖
‖ OHPID
𝑗↔𝑟
‖ 𝐸
𝑗→𝑟
⋅ (APID
𝑗
‖ PID
𝑖
‖ 𝐸
𝑘𝑖↔bs
(𝐷
𝑖
)) ‖ HMAC
𝑘𝑖↔bs
⋅ (PID
𝑖
‖ 𝐷
𝑖
) .
(15)
The transmission of𝑀
𝑗→𝑟
should be heard by all the neigh-
bors including both SN
𝑖
and SN
𝑟
. If SN
𝑖
hears themessage and
reads APID
𝑖
, the SN
𝑖
knows that𝑀
𝑖→ 𝑗
was received correctly
by SN
𝑗
. Only at this time, SN
𝑖
updates the value ofOHPID
𝑖↔𝑗
.
PID
𝑖
will be updated, as well, since SN
𝑖
is the source of the
message. Here are two scenarios.
Scenario 1. The packet sent by SN
𝑖
is lost or got corrupted. In
this scenario, SN
𝑗
considers nothing happened, so it will not
forward any message onward. Meanwhile, SN
𝑖
will wait for 𝜁
time to expire. It will send the message again with updated
APID
𝑖
. Once the message is acknowledged according to the
procedure explained earlier and if the SN is the source, then
PID
𝑖
, OHPID
𝑖
, and APID
𝑖
will be updated and be ready for
a new packet to be sent out. If it is intermediary SN, only
OHPID
𝑖
and APID
𝑖
are updated.
Scenario 2. The packet is received correctly by SN
𝑗
, the new
packet 𝑀
𝑗→𝑟
is sent out including the acknowledgement
APID
𝑖
, and SN
𝑗
updated the value of OHPID
𝑖↔𝑗
. However,
SN
𝑖
does not hear the forwarded message 𝑀
𝑗→𝑟
within
time 𝜁. At this moment, SN
𝑖
does not know for sure if the
packet was delivered or the acknowledgement is lost. It has
to account for the worst-case scenario. A copy of the message
will be retransmitted to SN
𝑗
with the current OHPID
𝑖
and
updated APID
𝑖
. SN
𝑗
can recognize the message because of
the value of old OHPID
𝑖
. After receiving the retransmitted
packet, it now sends direct acknowledgement to SN
𝑖
as in the
following expression:
ACK
𝑖←𝑗
= APID
𝑖
‖ Padding. (16)
BS is treated similar to normal SN, so it has to acknowledge
every packet it receives. After the packet is delivered to
the BS, and after the message is acknowledged, the PID
𝑖
(of the source) will be updated. Both the SN
𝑖
and the BS
will be ready to exchange a new message. As long as the
new message does not reach the BS before the old PID
𝑖
is
updated, the system will continue to be synchronized. This
way, we have a possible window of one message. However,
there is no guarantee to have all messages arrive in order.
The only way to do it is if the system accounts for minimum
interval time𝜔min, which is the minimum time span between
two messages. However, in some cases, the packet cannot
be delivered at all through a certain route. One obvious
scenario is when an intermediate node is depleted out of
energy before it forwards the message onward. The message
needs to be rerouted through a different intermediate node
which could cause a sever delay. We suggest implementing
a sliding window mechanism as exhibited in Figure 2. For
each sensor, we can have a window of 𝑊 size. If we have 𝑘
bits for the sequence number of the PID, then we can have a
sliding window of 2𝑘 − 1 slots. Once the BS finds out that the
sequence of PIDs is not synchronized, it will send a message
to resynchronize the sensor with the BS.
5.2.4. Transmission as a Broadcaster. Typically, the BS is
required to broadcast messages for control and management
purposes. Likewise, a sensor might need to broadcast a
message to the BS for network setup, maintenance, and other
management issues. A sensor, as well, could broadcast a
message for emergency or urgency reasons depending on the
application at hand. The framework requires keeping all the
packets, transmitted throughout the network, indistinguish-
able by the adversary. Thus, all the messages need to have
the same size. Broadcast is one-to-many transmission; a SN
𝑖
can broadcast a message to all the neighbors in the set 𝑁
𝑖
.
Each SN is preloaded with a broadcast key (kb
𝑖
) and assigned
broadcast pseudonym ID (BPID
𝑖
). The broadcast message
sent by SN
𝑖
is formatted as in the following expression:
𝑀
𝑏
= Padding ‖ BPID
𝑖
‖ 𝐸kb𝑖 (𝐷𝑏) . (17)
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Figure 2: Sliding window for received PIDs [19].
The broadcast message from a source SN
𝑖
will be received by
all the neighbors ∈ 𝑁
𝑖
. SN
𝑖
and the recipients will update
BPID
𝑖
according to the following expression:
BPID
𝑖
= 𝐻
1
(BPID
𝑖
⊕ 𝑏
𝑖
) . (18)
Upon receiving the broadcastmessage (𝑀
𝑏
), SN
𝑗
decrypts the
message using the stored key (kb
𝑖
) in the table TBL
𝑗
. It then
encrypts it again using kb
𝑗
and broadcasts𝑀
𝑏
to its one-hop
neighbors set (𝑁
𝑗
) as in the following expression:
𝑀
𝑏
= BPID
𝑖
‖ BPID
𝑗
‖ 𝐸kb𝑗 (𝐷𝑏) . (19)
When the BS receives a broadcast message, it is ultimately
the destination, so intuitively it does not need to broadcast
themessage again.Our proposed framework assumes that the
BS behaves like a normal sensor. To maintain this precourse,
we require the BS to broadcast the message again. Thus, we
introduce the limited broadcast where the BS will broadcast
only to one hop with TTL = 1. Likewise, to reduce the
unnecessary traffic, we have required the intermediary nodes
to rebroadcast only to the neighbors with smaller HC in case
of uplink messages and to neighbors with bigger HC in case
of downlink messages. What if the neighbors, with less HC,
are all dead? We could end up with a section completely
disconnected from the BS. The protocol needs to consider
broadcast messages to all the neighbors in this case.
5.2.5. Limited Broadcast Messages. A sensor inside network
maze can only recognize the neighbor sensors and the BS.
When SN broadcasts a message uplink, then all sensor
neighbors should hear it. When intermediary sensor gets
broadcast message, it should rebroadcast the message if and
only if the message is received from SN with bigger HC.This
way themessage is directed to the BS throughmultiple routes
while saving unnecessary traffic. The TTL = HCmax where
HCmax preloaded at the startup phase. The value will keep
reduced by one until it gets to the BS. In case of the downlink
messages from the BS to all the sensors, the intermediary
sensor would rebroadcast the message if and only if it is
coming from a SN with smaller HC. In this case the message
will hold TTL = 0 without change as an indication of BS as
the source until it reaches all the sensors. The special case
of broadcast is when TTL = 1 where the message will be
broadcasted to one hop only.
5.2.6. Fake Broadcast Message. The sensors need to send fake
messages to prevent time correlation attack and statistical
analysis. The rate of the fake messages follows a certain
protocol. Fake message is a one-hop broadcast message.
However, to prevent correlation, themessage needs to behave
similar to real messages. Therefore, the message needs to
be encrypted and has similar size as real messages. This
will make the fake messages indistinguishable from the real
messages. Since it has to carry a dummy data, we chose to
make it carry residual energy (Δ) of the source sensor. This
information will be extracted by the recipient neighbors and
saved in the related tuple in the table TBL.The fake broadcast
message sent by SN
𝑖
is explained in the following expression:
𝑀
𝑓
= Padding ‖ FPID
𝑖
‖ 𝐸kf𝑖 (Δ𝑖) . (20)
The fake broadcast message from SN
𝑖
will be received by all
the neighbors, for example, SN
𝑗
, SN
𝑢
, SNV ∈ 𝑁𝑖. SN𝑖 and the
recipients will then update FPID
𝑖
according to expression
FPID
𝑖
= 𝐻
1
(FPID
𝑖
⊕ 𝑐
𝑖
) . (21)
There is no need to worry about the pseudonym synchroniza-
tion since themain purpose of fakemessage is to showactivity
in idle sensors to obfuscate real messages.
5.3. SN Removal. There are many reasons why we need to
remove a sensor from the network. For instance, when the
battery of the sensor is about to deplete, it should refrain from
participating in transmission in preparation of removing it
from the network. This would protect against lost data and
keep the pseudonyms synchronized.
In some cases, WSN uses intrusion detection system
(IDS) [26], to protect against active attacks. Once SN is
captured by the ADV, SN must be removed from the net-
work and banned from participation in data transmission.
Procedurally, if SN
𝑖
opts to be removed, it sends twomessages
requesting the removal. The first message is to the BS as in
expression
𝑀
𝑖→ 𝑗
= OHPID
𝑖↔𝑗
‖ 𝐸
𝑘𝑖→ 𝑗
(PID
𝑖
‖ 𝐸
𝑘𝑖↔bs
(𝐷remove)) . (22)
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The tuple of the SN
𝑖
in the BS tables will be disabled perma-
nently. The SN
𝑖
will send a broadcast message to the neigh-
bors according to
𝑀
𝑏
= Padding ‖ BPID
𝑖
‖ 𝐸kb𝑖 (𝐷remove) . (23)
Once the neighbors get the message 𝐷remove, they will delete
the tuple related to SN
𝑖
from the tables. Neighbors will refrain
from exchanging messages with SN
𝑖
. The same process could
be established by the BS to remove a captured SN from the
network.
5.4. SN Addition. To add SN
𝑖
to the network, it will be pre-
loaded with all setup parameters: ID
𝑢
, 𝑎
𝑢
, 𝑏
𝑢
, 𝑐
𝑢
, 𝐻
1
, 𝑘
𝑢↔bs,
and kb
𝑢
, and fkb
𝑢
. Right after deployment, SN
𝑖
calculates
the shared parameters with its neighbors. The BS should
be trusted to run the process. Before sharing the calculated
parameters with the SN
𝑖
, the neighbors authenticate the new
sensor. The BS will send special key 𝑘add to all the nodes by
a broadcast message. SN
𝑖
will be preloaded with the same
key as well. SN
𝑖
and the neighbors will use this special key
to authenticate with each other. Initially, the BS sends the
following broadcast message to all of its one-hop neighbors
as in the following expression
𝑀
𝑏
= Padding ‖ BPIDbs ‖ 𝐸kb-bs (𝐷add) , (24)
where𝐷add is expressed in expression
𝐷add = hc ‖ 𝑘add. (25)
The initial value for hc is 0 where it represents the hop count.
It will be incremented every time the message is forwarded.
6. Security Analysis
We need to analyze our solution for both passive and active
ADV attacks. The ADV has global view of the WSN. Usually,
ADV starts by monitoring transmission somewhere in the
network and then attempts to capture the location of source
SNs or the BS. Once ADV determines the identity and
location of a source SN, it consequently launches active
attacks against certain SNs and tries to disrupt the operation
of the entire WSN. The main strength of passive ADV is
the fact that neither SNs nor the BS will know about their
existence since they act passively. However, active attacks can
be detected if the WSN implements a good IDS.
6.1. Security against Passive Attacks. SNs use disposable
pseudonyms to recognize each other instead of using the
real IDs. There is absolutely no real ID stored in the SN and
absolutely no one pseudonym is used more than once. In
addition, data is encrypted all the way from the source to the
destination using pairwise shared keys between sources and
the BS.
Eavesdropping and Content Analysis. ADV can intercept
messages without being able to decrypt thembecause they are
encrypted. The only information ADV can get of a captured
message is the pseudonyms which are all temporary IDs and
have no further use except to calculate new pseudonyms.
However, the ADV cannot get, from the captured messages,
important parameters 𝑎
𝑖↔𝑗
, 𝑏
𝑖
, or 𝑐
𝑖
which are required to
calculated new pseudonyms. Thus, the ADV will not be able
to create new pseudonyms.
Hop-by-Hop Trace. ADV can track hop-by-hop messages
from one node to another by overhearing the transmitted
messages to capture either the source SN or the BS.The ADV
will be facedwithmany real and fake transmissions, which are
identical, during the lifetime of the WSN. Furthermore, each
node uses different routes and the message content changes
completely after each transmission.
Size Correlation. This attack would not work for our frame-
work since all the messages have commensurate size whether
it is real or fake.
Identity Correlation. ADV cannot relate overheard IDs to SNs.
It is not possible since SNs use different pseudonyms every
time a message is transmitted.
Rate Monitoring. ADV tries to find different transmission
rates in the network, such as having higher transmission
rate nearby the BS or busy SNs. This is handled by issuing
fake messages all over the network to maintain similar
transmission rate over the lifetime of the WSN.
6.2. Security against Active Attacks. ADV could physically
compromise SN which gives the ADV the advantage of
monitoring messages sent and received through the captured
SN. We assume ADV knows encryption protocols used
by the system while the system hides encryption keys and
IDs. In such attacks, ADV tries to compromise SNs to get
information related to security of the system. Consequently,
it will monitor all packets going through the compromised
SN to capture the identities and important parameters. Once
ADV captures some privacy information, it reports it to
external executers to do further damages (such as killing the
Panda). Yet the IDS cannot detect that the SN is physically
captured due to the passive behavior of ADV. In some other
attacks, ADV captures SNs and actively forge messages, send
replay messages, and do other forms of invasive attacks.
Moreover, ADV could load powerful computers with cap-
tured credentials to launch more catastrophic attacks.
If ADVphysically compromises a SN, then it captures two
sets of information:
(i) information related to the node itself: the current
pseudonym PID, the parameters used to calculate the
pseudonyms, the hash functions, the keys, and other
information as listed in Notations;
(ii) information related to the neighbors as listed in
Table 1.
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In this case, the ADV will have all it needs to issue new
pseudonyms and send messages out to the neighbors.
Scenario 1. If ADV physically compromises SN
𝑖
and if SN
𝑗
and SN
𝑟
∈ 𝑁
𝑖
, so SN
𝑖
knows some information about both
SN
𝑗
and SN
𝑟
. However, it cannot calculate important infor-
mation such as 𝑎
𝑗↔𝑟
which is required for one-hop commu-
nication between SN
𝑗
and SN
𝑟
[16]. The reason is SN
𝑖
would
need ID
𝑗
and ID
𝑟
, which are both deleted at the end of the
startup phase. If SN
𝑖
hears a message transmitted among the
neighbors, then it cannot determine the source SN.
Scenario 2. If ADV physically compromises multiple SNs, let
us call it set𝑁
𝑐𝑠
, and collects number of messages, let us call
it set 𝑁
𝑐𝑚
. Then, the number of compromised PIDs is equal
to𝑁
𝑐𝑚
since each message has one unique PID. If the source
SN
𝑖
∉ 𝑁
𝑐𝑠
, then ADV cannot know the source node [16].
Scenario 3. If the message sent by source SN
𝑖
as in Scenario 2
passes through SN
𝑗
∈ 𝑁
𝑐𝑠
or even through multiple compro-
mised SNs, it will not be able to correlate the captured PID
with SN
𝑖
.
Scenario 4. If a message sent by source SN
𝑖
and ∀SN ∈ 𝑁
𝑖
is
also ∈ 𝑁
𝑐𝑠
(all neighbors are physically compromised), then
ADV will be able to know that SN
𝑖
is the source.
It is unrealistic situation to have many compromised
SNs. However, this proves that one or very few physically
compromised SNs do not for sure leak the ID and location
of the SN. None of the literature we have seen discussed this
worse-case situationwhere you have physically compromised
SNs. We have proved that even if we have some physically
compromised nodes, our system still can limit the leak of the
IDs and locations.
6.3. BS Security. ADV can learn about a SN receiving a
message in two ways: (i) when SN retransmits the message,
which is traced by ADV and (ii) the ADV being able to
correlate the ID with the recipient SN. ADV cannot locate
the BS by one compromised SN because every message uses
a different pseudonym. It will need to compromise multiple
SNs along the path to the BS, providing that compromised
SNs can collude together. The goal of this model is to delay
the capturing of the BS in the presence of multiple captured
and colluding SNs.
Let us presume SN
𝑟
∈ 𝑁
𝑐𝑠
. It issues a message with 𝐷
𝑏
such that APID
𝑟
‖ OHPID
𝑟↔𝑢
‖ 𝐸
𝑟→𝑢
(APID
𝑟
‖ PID
𝑟
‖
𝐸
𝑘𝑟↔bs
(𝐷
𝑏
)) [4]. If ADV compromises multiple nodes along
the path to the BS where it can decrypt the data at each SN
to always read this signature (PID
𝑟
‖ 𝐸
𝑘𝑟↔bs
(𝐷
𝑏
)). Reading
the similar signature, while ADV knows that every message
should be directed uplink to the BS tells the ADV that it is
in the right path to get the BS. Compromised SNs can even
collude to force the message to route through certain area in
effort to focus the search for the BS. This way, it will be able
to locate the BS sooner which is a function of (i) the size of
the network, (ii) the trafficdensity in the network, and (iii) the
number of compromised SNs. To solve this issue, themessage
signature (PID
𝑟
‖ 𝐸
𝑘𝑟↔bs
(𝐷
𝑏
)) needs to be scrambled at every
hop. So, every message will be forwarded to the next hop as
follows:
𝑀
𝑢→𝑥
= APID
𝑢
‖ OHPID
𝑢↔𝑥
‖ 𝐸
𝑢→𝑥
⋅ (APID
𝑢
‖ PID
𝑟
‖ PID
𝑢
‖ 𝐸
𝑘𝑢↔bs
(𝐸
𝑘𝑟↔bs
(𝐷
𝑖
))) .
(26)
We have added multiple levels of encryption, which will
be done at every hop using the shared key between the
hop and the BS. In addition, PID of the hop will be added
in sequence, so the BS can do the decryption in sequence
upon message arrival. This solution increases the size of the
message proportionally to the number of hops the message
goes through. It will also add multiple levels of decryption
at the BS. We suggest having the onion encryption done for
a distance of few hops, 𝑂
ℎ
[4]. So, if 𝑂
ℎ
= 2, then we have
only two extra encryptions. In addition, we need to account
for two PID’s added to the message. This size of 𝑂
ℎ
can be
adjusted by the closed-loop control system according to the
security needs and the WSN environment.
6.4. SLP and BSLP. SLP and BSLP are achieved at first by
having successful source, link, and BS anonymity, which
was thoroughly argued earlier. ADV cannot infer any infor-
mation from the intercepted messages. Passive attacks will
not endanger the location privacy. Having IDS will handle
active attacks. However, having active attacks by physically
compromised SNs could hinder the location privacy if many
SNs are captured in one area.
6.5. Timing Privacy. By using fake messages at variable inter-
val times, it becomes super hard for the ADV to correlate
messages being transmitted over the network as exhibited in
Figure 3.
6.6. Routing Privacy. Although shortest path routing is used
in this framework, choosing the next hop is done according
to certain probabilistic algorithm, which accounts for the
residual energy levels and usage frequency to increase the
route privacy, as exhibited in Algorithm 1 and Figure 4. ADV
cannot relate routes to nodes [20]. Even if two messages
follow the exact same route, ADV will see them as if they
are two different routes since each node along the route has
different PIDs.
6.7. Data Privacy. Messages are encrypted before transmis-
sion and reencrypted at every hop along the route to the BS.
Data will be authenticated by a message digest created by a
secure hash function.The physically compromised nodes are
able to inject data in the network but good IDS can detect
the falsified data. The system adopts a secure procedure to
remove compromised SNs from theWSN and adopts another
procedure to add sensors as needed.
6.8. Energy and Location Safety Period. In this work, we will
assume a simple energy consumption model [20, 27, 28].
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Figure 3: (a) Sensors sense events and send real messages while the rest send fake messages, with fake MSG’s: 𝑃
𝑟
= 1/𝑁 = 1/48 = 2% and
without fake MSG’s: 𝑃
𝑟
= 1/𝑛 = 1/11 = 9%. (b) Sensors sending new real or forward messages will not send fake messages. The more the
network gets busy the less fake messages transmitted [19, 20].
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Procedure: SELECT FORWARD NODE PROC;
Input:𝑁
𝑖
Output: Messages out
Δ = 0;
for 𝑖 in𝑁
𝑖
// total number of neighbors
{Δ = Δ + SN[𝑖, Δ];}
Average Δ = Δ/𝑁
𝑖
;
for 𝑖 in𝑁
𝑖
{
𝑥 = Average Δ;
if (SN[𝑖, link] == uplink) && (SN[𝑖, Δ] >= 𝑥)
𝐽 = SN[𝑖, OHPID]
𝑋 = SN[𝑖, Δ];
}
If 𝑗 != null
Return;
for 𝑖 in𝑁
𝑖
{
𝑥 = Average Δ;
if (SN[𝑖, link] == equal-link) && (SN[𝑖, Δ] >= 𝑥)
𝐽 = SN[𝑖, OHPID]
𝑋 = SN[𝑖, Δ];
}
If 𝑗 != null
Return;
for 𝑖 in𝑁
𝑖
{
𝑥 = Average Δ;
if (SN[𝑖, link] == down-link) && (SN[𝑖, Δ] >= 𝑥)
𝐽 = SN[𝑖, OHPID]
𝑋 = SN[𝑖, Δ];
}
If 𝑗 != null
Return;
Algorithm 1: Selecting the forward SN according to the residual energy level.
The radio consumes@ nJ/bit for both transmission and recep-
tion by the SN’s circuitry. In addition, it consumes 𝜀 nJ/bit/m2
for the transmitter amplifier to achieve an acceptable signal
to noise ratio. Therefore, to transmit 𝑘 bits for 𝑟 distance, the
total transmission energy dissipation will be
𝐸trans = 𝑘 ∗ @ + 𝑘 ∗ 𝑟
2
∗ 𝜀. (27)
Moreover, the receiver would consume for reception of
𝑘-bit message
𝐸receiv = 𝑘 ∗ @. (28)
The energy spent for transmission or reception is almost
constant per a message since we have fixed-size messages
to prevent size correlation attacks. If we have 𝑝 percent
of the nodes issue fake data at a specific period, then 𝑝
percent of the energy and the bandwidth is wasted for the
sake of WSN rate privacy. The consumption of transmitting
fake messages is a double-fold since the transmitter will
consume 𝐸trans for every message and all the neighbors 𝑛 will
consume (𝑛 ∗ 𝐸trans).When the transmission range increases,
𝑛 increases. The total energy consumed in the network to
send real messages in one interval, where (𝑞) is the average
percentage of SNs sending or forwarding real messages and
(𝑛) is the average SN neighbors [28], is as follows:
𝐸
𝑅
= (𝑞 ∗ 𝑁) (𝑘 ∗ @ + 𝑘 ∗ 𝑟2 ∗ 𝜀) + (𝑞 ∗ 𝑁 ∗ 𝑛) (𝑘 ∗ @) .
(29)
The exact value of 𝑞 cannot be known since it is an event
driven value, which depends on the situation of the WSN
at that time. The total energy consumed in the network to
send fake messages in one interval where (𝑝) is the specified
percentage value of fakemessages at one interval is as follows:
𝐸
𝐹
= (𝑝) ∗ 𝑁 ∗ (𝑘 ∗ @ + 𝑘 ∗ 𝑟2 ∗ 𝜀)
+ (𝑝) ∗ 𝑁 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ (𝑘 ∗ @) .
(30)
Energy transmission efficiency ETE [20] can be calcu-
lated as
ETE =
𝐸
𝑅
𝐸
𝑅
+ 𝐸
𝐹
. (31)
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Figure 4: How to choose the forwarding node according to the energy levels of the neighboring sensors [19, 20].
The energy safety period is the time when the first sensor
is depleted. However, transmission of data is distributed
among all sensors to make sure the safety period lasts longer.
The level of the energy in every sensor is measured and
considered as a decision factor (among others) for selecting
the next-hop for the message. This will definitely help to
distribute the network accumulative energy consumption
over the whole WSN. The location safety period is the
period between capturing the first packet and finding out
the location of the source or the BS. It is measured as the
ratio between the period of discovering the location and the
interval period [25]. We have implemented a WSN of 300
SNs uniformly distributed over 200 × 200 area. The average
distance between SNs is 15. For the simulation, a SN sends
only 10% fakemessage of the total messages.That means that,
among ten real messages, it will send only one fake message
since we presumed a busy network. This could be scaled up
or down. Increasing the fake message will increase the power
dissipation.
Figure 5 shows that EEAC provides improved source
safety period compared to EAC [4]. Figure 6 shows that
EEAC also provides a stronger BS safety period compared to
EAC [4]. However, the source safety period is much more
than the sink safety period in both schemes. It is always
harder to achieve BSLP due to the volume of transmissions
nearby the BS. The efficiency of energy dissipation is due to
adopting Algorithm 1 for selecting the forward SN where it
takes in consideration the residual energy levels of the SNs,
whichwas not considered in EAC. Figure 7 shows the delay in
EEAC is very comparable to the EACdue the extra processing
and security implementation. Furthermore, Figure 8 shows
that the average total delivery time source-to-BS is also very
comparable to EAC.
7. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our system,
by evaluating the storage, processing, computational, and
communication costs.
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Figure 5: Source safety period.
7.1. Storage Evaluation. There are two sets of information
stored in a SN
𝑖
: (i) information related to the sensor itself,
such as random numbers: (𝑎
𝑖
, 𝑏
𝑖
, 𝑐
𝑖
), pseudonyms: (PID
𝑖
,
BPID
𝑖
, FPID
𝑖
,APID
𝑖
), keys: (𝑘
𝑖↔bs, kb𝑖,fkb𝑖) and (ii) infor-
mation related to each neighbors which includes random
numbers: (𝑎
𝑖↔𝑗
, 𝑏
𝑗
, 𝑐
𝑗
), pseudonyms: (OHPID
𝑖↔𝑗
,BPID
𝑗
,
FPID
𝑗
), and keys: (𝑘
𝑖↔𝑗
), Misc: (link
𝑖↔𝑗
, Δ
𝑗
).
If we presume that the keys, the random numbers, the
pseudonyms, and the hash functions are all 𝑛 bits long
in average and the required bits for miscellaneous data
altogether are two bytes and the average number of neighbors
𝑁ave, then the total storage memory required is
Storage = 10𝑛 + (7𝑛 + 16) ∗ 𝑁ave. (32)
Chen et al. [16] indicated the storage for SAS, CAS, APR,
DCARPS, and EAC. We also calculated the storage for PhID,
ACS, HIR, and RHIR. All are listed in Table 2. The size of
storage proportionally increases when the size of n increases.
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Table 2: Performance comparison. 𝑁 is the total number of sensors; 𝑁ave is the average number of neighbors; 𝑘 is number of stored hash
values where the SN stores 𝑘 hash values per one neighbor which are calculated in advance at startup phase [4, 16, 19, 25].
Scheme Storage cost (bits) Computation cost
1 SAS 2𝑛𝑁 + 4𝑛𝑁ave + 16 No hashing operations
2 CAS 6𝑛 + 7𝑛𝑁ave + 16 Two hashing operations and two encryptions
3 HIR 2𝑛 + 2𝑛𝑁ave One hashing function
4 RHIR 2𝑛 + 2𝑛𝑁ave + 𝑛𝑘𝑁ave No hashing functions
5 APR 9𝑛 + 7𝑛𝑁ave + 2𝑁 − 2𝑁ave − 2 Six hashing functions
6 DCARPS and Global DCARPS 3𝑛 No hashing functions
7 ACS 5𝑛𝑁ave Two hashing functions
8 PhID (3𝑛 + 2) ∗ 𝑁ave Four hashing functions
9 EAC 6𝑛 + 6𝑛𝑁ave + 2 Four hashing operations
10 E2AC 10𝑛 + (7𝑛 + 16) ∗ 𝑁ave Four hashing operations and 𝑂ℎ encryptions
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Figure 6: BS safety period.
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Figure 7: Transmission delay.
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Figure 8: Message delivery time.
The most common hashing functions are MD4 [29] which
uses 128-bit digest, SHA-1 [29] which uses 160-bit digest,
and Whirlpool [29] which uses 512-bit digest. The size of
the storage would increase when the number of neighbors
increases. Each SN has limited flash memory size, which
could confine the maximum number of neighbors that a
sensor can fit. As an example, TelosB mote [11, 16] has 1MB
external flash memory. Thus, if one neighbor node requires
1.2 k bits of storage memory, then TelosB could have more
than 800 neighbors, which is very much more than what is
needed in practical networks. Although our model shows a
bit of increase in the storage required to store the pseudonyms
but it is the only one among discussed protocols in this work
that provides a steady and functional anonymity and location
privacy under sever global and active attack. In addition, the
current technology provides enough storage, which makes it
no issue at all.
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7.2. Processing and Computational Evaluation. Hash func-
tions are used to calculate the pseudonyms and symmetric
cryptography is used to encrypt the messages. Because we
need to calculate three pseudonyms and one acknowledge-
ment after each transmission, thus using encryption to create
pseudonyms was avoided since it requires more processing
power compared to hash functions. When a SN senses data,
it needs to have OWH calculations for PID, OHPID, and
APID at the sender and OHPID at the receiver. If the system
opts for data authentication, then another hash function is
needed. The source node needs only one encryption for the
data if 𝑂
ℎ
= 0; however, it needs 𝑂
ℎ
more encryptions if
onion fashion is used [4]. Each intermediary node needs
one decryption operation and then another encryption for
the new data. Chen et al. [16] indicates that SAS does not
use hashing or encryption to create pseudonyms because it
uses already created pseudonyms from a space. The other
scheme by Chen et al. [16], CAS, uses two hashing operations
and two encryption operations. APR uses at least six hashing
functions. DCARPS uses constant IDs, so there are no hash-
ing functions or encryptions for creating IDs. EAC has four
hashing operations. None of the other schemes can achieve
privacy against global threats and active adversary attacks.
The power consumption due to the additional encryption
operations is marginal compared to the power consumption
caused by data transmission.
7.3. Communication Cost Evaluation. The most expensive
operation for power consumption is transmission of bits from
one node to another. We use two stages for air communi-
cation in our framework: (i) the startup phase and (ii) the
communication phase. The data transmission during startup
phase is minimal since the BS beacon and the neighbors’
information exchange happens once before the steady com-
munication phase.During communication phase, datawill be
forwarded hop-by-hop to the BS. Every packet is equally sized
to prevent time and size correlation. We have introduced a
probabilistic fake packet transmission scheme which none of
the other protocols adopted. When a SN does not have real
message, it will send fake message according to the protocol
discussed earlier.
The cost per message at one interval time is
Average Message Cost =
𝑅 + (𝑁 − 𝑅) 𝑃𝑟 + 𝐴
𝑅
, (33)
where 𝑅 is the total number of SNs with real messages at
one interval time, 𝑃
𝑟
the probability of sending fake message
by SNs, and 𝐴 the average number of acknowledgements
in one interval. None of the other schemes addressed the
issue of rate analysis attacks, which is one of the easiest
attacks any adversary can use. Using fake messages is an
expensive solution. However, we have designed our model
to be adaptive to the network traffic situation by using a
closed-loop system. The BS can always increase or decrease
the amount of fake messages used according to the reports it
is getting about the system security.
8. Conclusions and Future Work
The scheme presented in this work provides source, link,
and BS anonymity, SLP and BSLP. Most of the previous
work assumed local adversary view and passive attackmodel.
This work addressed local and global adversary network
view. It handles both passive and active attack models.
Anonymity cannot provide temporal privacy. To provide
temporal privacy, the global adversary needs to see a maze of
transmissions happening all over the network. Fakemessages
were introduced. However, using fake messages needs to be
adjusted to manage the energy consumption. The presented
model can handle both homogenous and heterogeneous
sensor nodes in terms of initial energy levels. It uses the
energy level as the main indicator in deciding how to route
packets forward. We have demonstrated that our framework
can withstand most of the known passive and active attacks.
We have discussed many scenarios and provided solutions.
The storage cost was mathematically analyzed for the frame-
work. We also have discussed the complexity of computa-
tional operations performed in the system, which includes
encryption and hash functions. To provide security against
multi colluding active attackers, we have introduced onion
encryptions.The future work would include enhancement on
the probabilistic scheme for fakemessages usage.We also will
implement our model for clustered networks.
Notations
𝑎
𝑖
: Random number shared between SN
𝑖
and
BS
𝑏
𝑖
: Random number shared between SN
𝑖
and
neighbors
𝑐
𝑖
: Random number shared between SN
𝑖
and
neighbors
𝐻: Hash function to create pseudonyms, the
keys, and data digest
𝑘
𝑖↔bs: Pairwise key shared between SN𝑖 and BS
kb
𝑖
: Broadcast key for SN
𝑖
fkb
𝑖
: Fake broadcast key for SN
𝑖
𝑁: Number of SNs
𝑁
𝑖
: Number of neighboring
HC
𝑖↔bs: Hop-count between SN𝑖 and BS
PID
𝑖
: Pseudonym ID shared between SN
𝑖
and BS
BPID
𝑖
: Broadcast pseudonym ID
𝑎
𝑖↔𝑗
: Random value shared between SN
𝑖
and
SN
𝑗
𝑘
𝑖↔𝑗
: Pairwise key shared between SN
𝑖
and SN
𝑗
OHPID
𝑖↔𝑗
: Pseudonym ID shared between SN
𝑖
and
SN
𝑗
APID
𝑖
: ACK pseudonym ID for SN
𝑖
BPID
𝑖
: Fake broadcast pseudonym ID
TBL
𝑖
: Table in SN
𝑖
for shared parameters
TIME STAMP: Time stamp
𝐷
𝑖
: Sensed data transmitted inside the
message
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SEQ NO: Sequence number for a message
TTL: Time to live
MCG LGTH: Message size
Δ residual: Residual energy
⊕: XOR Operation
‖: Concatenation operation.
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